Markets and global justice

Once chosen a reliable and objective source of authoritative notice to be used in deciding whether trade with a particular regime is legitimate or not, we can proceed in analysing what empirical changes in trade policies Wenar proposes in order to stop trading with countries rated 7 in both indices by Freedom House. Most of the reforms proposed by Wenar would take place within resources importing countries,: the US national courts, for instance, will adopt rulings establishing whether trade in natural resources with a certain country is allowed or forbidden.

Such rulings will set legal precedents and will regulate the activities of national resource corporations. There are no impositions on resource-exporting countries’ policies, but such countries should adopt reforms as well in order for them to be allowed to sell their natural wealth. Wenar mentions five main areas where reforms that aim at fighting the resource curse should take place, in both exporting and importing countries:

• Anti-corruption: laws in importing-countries jurisdictions should be adopted in order to deter and if necessary to punish any attempt to bribe officials in international business transactions.

• Transparency: a mechanism for making information about resource revenue flows publicly available should be established in resource-exporting countries, whereas the importing countries should implement legislation on resource corporations transparency.

• Revenue distribution: revenues from resource sales should be distributed among adult citizens of the extracting-country. Wenar argues, "revenue distribution would require governments to derive their revenues from taxation and so to become more responsive to public concerns."

• Resource certification: on the model provided by the Kimberley Process for fighting trade in “blood diamonds,” both resourceimporting and exporting states should certify the resources they trade.

• Commercial detachment and isolation: countries not adopting the reforms above would be sanctioned and become the target of commercial detachment. The solution to the resource curse partly lies in the enforcement of public accountability over resources. Who manage and sell natural resources should be accountable to the people of the country for such management.

Yet the persistence of the might-makes-right customary rule in the behaviour of international community encourages the avoidance of such accountability for natural resources agents. Many international treaties and covenants on human rights require public accountability, as stated by Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentioned above. Wenar refers more than once to the importance of such declaration. When human rights covenants state that "all people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources…" they are actually requiring whoever controls natural resources to be accountable to the people to whom the resources belong. Thus, when this rule is not satisfied we are in presence of a severe infringement of human rights treaties and international law. The people are entitled to property rights on their country's natural wealth and resources: this is the reason why Wenar declares that all the reforms he suggests to be implemented in trade policies of resource importing countries actually aim at enforcing public accountability in resource cursed countries, since this is the way to enforce property rights.

For Wenar, enforcing the principle of public accountability should be the primary goal of all reforms in importing countries’ trade policies since it combines three basic norms of international law: self-determination, which entitles the people to the right not to be prevented by any agent to the exercise of their authority over the law and, thus, to freely dispose of their natural wealth for their own ends; human rights, which entitles the people to the right of pursuing a worthwhile life and not to be oppressed by authoritarians; and property rights, according to which the resources are property of the people and whoever is entrusted to resources management must be accountable to their owners. Wenar links the resource curse also to tax rates, arguing that until the élites governing cursed countries will rely on natural resource exports instead that taxes to fund themselves they won’t be accountable to the people since, thanks to resource revenues, they can afford to go against the interests of the people. In such countries, tax rates are very low. Thus, until governments will not rely on tax payments to survive, they will not be accountable to the people nor do they respond to the people’s needs. Wenar's proposal should provide incentives for the governors of resource exporting countries to be more accountable to the people under their rule for their conduct.