and acquire a European dimension. At the same time, the hypothesis
of a European public opinion is connected to the multilingual theme
which will be dealt with in Chapter I.
An explanation will be given of the instruments used up to now by the
Union to reach the general public such as the antennas of Europe
Direct, European Centres for Permanent Education, the official web-
portal EUROPA, as well as audiovisual services. The Union also has
access to another tool, the Eurobarometer, which is used to determine
in what direction national public opinions are heading. The
methodology used for the Eurobarometer will be discussed further on
in this paper.
An overview of the iter which the European Institutions, and in
particular the Commission, have followed up to now in managing both
information and communication aimed at the general public will allow
us to introduce an analysis of the above-mentioned White Paper and
as well of two other important documents which are a completion of
the framework of the actions to be taken in order to reinforce both the
transparency and openness of the European Union towards its citizens
and that is, the Action Plan by the Commission to Improve
Communicating Europe and Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and
Debate. These arguments are still in an evolving phase but
nonetheless they allow us to formulate hypotheses regarding possible
routes to follow and proposals for the future.
A specific section of Chapter III is dedicated to the European
Federation of Public Communication Associations whose creation is
an indication of the sensibility that transpires not only within the
European Institutional framework, towards a transnational public
debate.
VI
I.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS CITIZENS:
HOW TO REDUCE THE DISTANCE
1. Institutional Communication of the European Union and
Democratic Legitimacy: Parallel Challenges
On 1 February 2006 the Commission presented the White Paper on
European Communication Policy
1
. This document can be considered
the sum of all of the efforts and proposals made throughout the past
years regarding information and communication in the European
Union. The Commission would like to create the conditions needed to
confer communication with the status of an actual policy in the same
way as all the other policies which the EU deals with in order to
increase the awareness of all the other European institutions and
Member States on the fact that an «authentic dialogue» between
themselves and European citizens is directly functional to the
democratic legitimacy that the Union has been hoping to achieve for
some time now.
It is a question, therefore, of conferring a strategic functional role to
communication in order to ensure the process of integration and to
consider it as being a key-element towards the understanding of the
European citizens of what it really means to be part of the EU. The
Commission’s proposal, therefore, aims at reducing the distance
between the European Union and its citizens by relaunching the public
debate in Europe.
1
COM(2006) 35 final 1.2.2006.
1
The first question from where the Commission’s reflection starts off
is why European citizens have turned away from the Union and why
they continue to do so, hindering in this way a complete adhesion to a
supranational dimension which should theoretically improve the lives
of the people of the Member States. Many experts have attempted to
answer this question throughout the years and especially in those
moments when the integration process began crossing over the purely
economic ambit in order to begin the process of identifying Europe as
a «polity» and as a union of citizens and populations.
One of the strongest accusations made against the EU has always
regarded the so-called democratic deficit which is considered to be
one of the main causes behind the turning away of the European
citizens from the EU. Technically speaking, right from the days of the
EEC, this is the legitimacy defect of the Community’s decisional
process which is tied to the fact that Community Acts having a
basically legislative nature and which can be implemented with regard
to both the Member States and to the single individuals are issued by
bodies (the Council, as proposed by the Commission) that are not
elected by the citizens themselves and which are able to avoid an
actual parliament-type of control
2
. An aspect of the deficit which is
the one most emphasized by the doctrine regards the fact that the
transferral of the direct control of policies and normative acts from the
competences of the national Parliaments to those of the Union, did not
give way to the assignment of an equivalent power of control to the
European Parliament
3
. The limits on the powers of the Parliament
created a democratic gap which could have been tolerated as long as
2
U. DRAETTA, Elementi di diritto dell’Unione Europea, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 2004, p. 15.
3
F. ATTINÀ, «Democrazia, elezioni e partiti nell’Unione Europea», Dalla Comunità all’Unione
Europea, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 1994, p. 49.
2
integration maintained a basically economic vocation, but it became
unbearable after the substantial increase in the competences delegated
to the Community by the Member States. These competences were
removed from the democratic control they would have been under if
they had been kept at a national level
4
.
Beginning with the Treaty of Maastricht
5
and then proceeding with
those of Amsterdam
6
and Nice
7
, a number of concrete solutions to the
problem of democratic legitimacy have been elaborated, and
especially with the introduction of legislative procedures characterized
by an even more intense participation by the Parliament
8
. It is evident
however, that whereas national Parliaments exclusively detain all
those competences which regard both ordinary and constitutional
legislation, the European Parliament is forced to share them with the
EU Council with regards to the former and it is excluded by the
European Council with regards to the latter
9
. At the present time, the
European Parliament also has control of the political area in the same
way as the national Parliaments do within each of the Member States.
The similarity is solely formal however, since these powers do not
possess any of the substantial characteristics of a Parliamentary
control which is present for internal law. In particular, political control
is not carried out with regard to an organ that after all is responsible
for Community action, and that is the Council with the
4
The Treaty of Maastricht, in force since 1 Nov. 1993, led to the creation of the European Union, a
term which encompasses the relations of the Member States in a three-pillar structure (the Economic
and Social Policy pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP pillar, and the Justice and
Home Affairs pillar) (U. DRAETTA, op.cit., p. 32).
5
Treaty of Maastricht, signed on 7.2.1992 and in force since 1.11.1993, GUCE C 191 of 29.7.1992.
6
Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2.10.1997 and in force since 1.5.1999, GUCE C 340 of 10.11.1997.
7
Treaty of Nice, signed on 26.2.2002 and in force since 1.2.2003, GUCE C 80 of 10.3.2001.
8
The procedures of co-operation and codecision work along side of the simple function of consultation
(the codecision procedure has become commonplace today for almost all Acts having a legislative
nature).
9
S. DELLA VALLE, Una costituzione senza popolo? La costituzione europea alla luce delle concezioni
del popolo come «potere costituente», Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 2002, p. 267.
3
Representatives of the Member States
10
. Therefore, even political
control in the Community system would appear to be defective if one
considers the normal mechanisms of representative democracy. In
conclusion, one can ascertain that fundamental decisions regarding
European politics can be influenced by the Parliament of Strasbourg
which cannot however, implement them in either a decisive or
autonomous way.
The accusation of a scarce democratic legitimacy obviously involves
other European institutions as well. The European Commission is
often seen as the main beneficiary of the transferral of powers from a
national level to a Community one, even though it completely lacks
the requisites of legitimacy based on political responsibility
11
. In fact,
it is a joint institution of individuals (one for each Member State)
chosen «on the basis of their general competence» (art. 213, no.1,
TCE) and nominated on an individual basis by means of a complex
procedure where the Council and the European Parliament have the
last word
12
. The situation is not any more satisfactory even as far as
the European Union Council is concerned. The Council has the task to
coordinate the general economic policies of the Member States and
10
On the other hand one must realistically admit that political control on the Council by the European
Parliament would be incompatible with the nature of the European Communities that still remain
international organizations made up of member States, and it would push the latter towards federal
solutions which at the moment are not considered possible by the member Countries. While awaiting
these evolutions, the serious problem of a lack of democratic control on the work of the Executive in a
Community ambit still remains (U. DRAETTA, op. cit., p. 115 and ss.).
11
The Commission is considered to be the “guardian” of the Treaties with the power of initiative in its
hands, but this exclusiveness is slowly eroding in favour of the European Parliament, the European
Council and the BCE (U. DRAETTA, op.cit., p. 106).
12
The nomination procedure for the Commission takes place in a number of phases. The Council meets
together with the Heads of State and Government and deliberating by qualified majority, designates the
person that it intends to nominate as President of the Commission, a designation that must be approved
by the European government. The Council, once again by qualified majority and in agreement with the
designated President, adopts the list of other persons that it intends to nominate as Commissioners.
Lastly, the designated President and Commissioners are collectively subject to a vote of approval by the
European Parliament. After this approval, the entire Commission is nominated by the Council that
deliberates by qualified majority (U. DRAETTA, op. cit., p. 88 and ss.).
4
article 207 of the EC Treaty explicitly confers it with the possibility to
act as a legislator. It is evident that entrusting a legislative function to
a body that is not elected by the people, widens the distance within the
democratic deficit. In this regard, by asserting that each Council
member is also a government member of his own State and bound to
the political guidelines expressed by the national Parliament
democratically elected, does not help to lighten the problem of a
solely second degree legitimacy also because the Council is not
subject to an actual political control by either the national Parliaments
or by the European one
13
.
One must also take note of the assumption of pre-eminence assumed
over time by the European Council, made up of State and government
leaders, and ratified by art. 4 TUE, which «gives the Union the
impetus needed for its development and also defines the orientation of
policies in general»
14
. The European Council is not really an
institution, a term which is often wrongly used, but rather it is a
«reunion» of the institutions of the Member States similar to an
international conference. In fact, it carries out an ever-increasing role
of being an impetus for Community activities, appropriating itself of
and at the same time reducing the power of initiative that the Treaties
grant to the Commission. Furthermore, the obligation to present a
report to the European Parliament after each meeting that is held is in
no way connected to precise juridical consequences and as well, it
does not allow the Parliament to politically verify its activities since
the abovementioned report is presented after each meeting and not
13
U. DRAETTA, op. cit., p. 80.
14
A. MANZELLA, «Gli equilibri costituzionali nell’Unione Europea», Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso –
Sfera Pubblica e Costituzione europea, Carocci Editore, Rome, Annuals 2001, p. 24.
5
beforehand
15
. If one examines the Community institutional system and
the confusion among the powers that define it with a prejudicial
glance at the only authentic democratic demand, then the EU appears
to be far from the criteria that is has requested and continues to
request from all those countries that want to adhere to it, giving way to
the famous paradox that states that the Union could not accept itself as
a member.
Sides were strongly taken with regard to the solution of the
democratic legitimacy problem with the opening of a debate on the
future of Europe as provided for in the Treaty of Nice and launched by
the European Council which was held in Laeken, Belgium, in
December 2001.
The conclusion of the document announced among other things, the
institution of a «Convent» made up of representatives of the European
Parliament, the Commission, governments and Parliaments of the
Member States and of the ten new States which at the time were
candidates for entry into the EU and which was given the task to
improve the democratic structure of the Union. In the few but intense
pages that make up the Declaration of Laeken, and which defined the
Convent’s mandate, numerous references are made to the need for
«democratic legitimacy», «democratic control», «democratic values»,
proving the fact that this is the crucial unresolved question of the
European construction
16
. This Convent has resulted in a project
regarding a European Constitution adopted by the Heads of State and
Government in June 2004, but which stills awaits to be ratified
17
.
15
U. DRAETTA, op.cit., p. 43 and ss.
16
Ivi, p.19 and ss.
17
The Constitutional Treaty will be in force only after it has been ratified by all of the Member States.
Notwithstanding the two «no» victories in the referendums held in France and in the Netherlands which
6
Those involved in drawing up the «Constitution» believe that the
measures contained in it will increase democratic spirit, transparency
and the powers of the European Union even though some of the new
items introduced have turned out to be far more form and far less
substance. In general, there should be a simplification of the
procedures thereby becoming more comprehensible to the citizens,
and a clearer division of the competences between the Union and the
Member States and the various European institutions. As well, the
democratic foundations which are at the basis of the Union are
proclaimed (pluralism, liberty, rights of man, justice, state subject to
the rule of law, solidarity and non-discrimination, etc.) and the process
to strengthen the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of the citizens
by inserting in the Constitution the Charter of Fundamental Rights
18
is begun thereby giving it legal effect. A closer association of national
Parliaments in the Community decision-making processes was also
foreseen according to an «early warning» mechanism which will
took place respectively on 29 May and 1 June, 2005, the ratification process continues. Up to now, 15
countries have ratified the Constitution: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
18
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice on 7 December, 2000,
constitutes the synthesis of the values shared by the Member States of the European Union. Its finality
is contained in the preamble: necessary to render more visible in a Charter and to reinforce the
safeguarding of fundamental rights in light of the evolution of society, social progress, and scientific
and technological developments». In Nice, the Presidents of the European Parliament, the council and
the Commission signed the Charter for the three institutions. However, the Heads of State and
Government reunited have decided not to include in the Treaty any reference to the Charter which
means that even though it has political value (for the first time civil and political, economic and social
are found in one document), the Charter has no binding juridical value. The Charter reinforces the
certainty of rights with regards to the protection of fundamental rights which were once solely
guaranteed by the Court of Justice and by art. 6 of the EU Treaty. It is made up of an introductory
preamble and by 54 articles subdivided into 7 sections: dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, citizenship,
justice, general dispositions. In December 2001, the European Council met in Laeken, Belgium and
decided to convocate a Convent regarding the future of Europe within the prospect of a future inter-
governmental Conference. The Declaration of Laeken established that one of the main tasks of the
Convent was to take a stand on the eventual integration of the Charter with European law. The Convent
met for the first time on 28 February 2002 under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. On 18
July, 2003 the European Convent presented the treaty project that establishes a Constitution for Europe
and where the Charter of Fundamental rights in integrally present from articles II-39 to II-46. If the
Constitution project is approved, the insertion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights will render it
binding in a juridical sense.
7
block the Union’s decisional iter in case constitutional norms are
violated. The powers of the European Parliament were further
strengthened by the extension of co-decisional procedures and the
recognition of a role on equal terms with the Council in the area of
budgetary procedures. Lastly, a legislative initiative having a popular
origin has been foreseen giving Union citizens numbering at least one
million, the possibility to formally invite the Commission to legislate
an argument thought to be very important. This is considered to be
one of the most democratic options implemented by the Constitution.
A special section of the Constitutional Treaty is dedicated to the
democratic life of the Union. Placing the concept of a representative
democracy side by side to a participative one (listening to the citizens
and to their associative forms while aiming at a co-decisional process)
becomes the political goal and the means for key action
19
. Art. I-46,
Title VI of the Constitutional Treaty affirms that «[…] EU Institutions
give citizens and their representative associations the possibility, by
means of adequate channels, to make known and to publicly exchange
opinions on all the action areas of the Union maintaining an open,
transparent and regular dialogue with the representative associations
and the civil society».
The coming into force of the Constitution could, therefore, render
concrete the establishment of the so-called «two-way»
20
democracy, a
19
S. ROLANDO, «La questione della democrazia partecipativa in Europa. Ragioni dell’attualità», Rivista
italiana di comunicazione pubblica, no. 26, 2005.
20
The objective of the Constitutional Treaty is to find a balance between representative democracy and
participative democracy, with the intent to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of the institutional
effects of the Union. Together with the Constitutional Charter of Portugal, only the Constitutional
Treaty of the EU profiles the institution of a participative democracy. Therefore, the intent is to bring
civil society closer to the institutions, with the articulated expressive modality ricomposition that an
evolved democracy requests (N. DELAI, «Cittadini e società civile fra partecipazione ed efficienza
decisionale», Rivista italiana di comunicazione pubblica, no. 26, 2005, pp. 9-13).
8
situation which would require the use of specific instruments and
communication actions, seen from a viewpoint that favours
transparency, dialogue and different forms of consultations from the
Union’s institutions. The indications contained in the constitutional
text risk however, to reveal themselves as being mere programmatic
norms due to the lack of method indications and lead us to ask what
magnitude will the consultation institution actually reach and what
decisions will regard it.
It would appear that not even the introduction of a Constitutional
Treaty is a guarantee for reaching such levels of democraticity that
would lead one to think that the democratic deficit has been definitely
overcome. The answers must be looked for elsewhere and one of the
tools that can be used to democratically legitimise the Union is
communication.
1.1 Democratic deficit or information deficit?
The «democratic deficit» formula seems to have fallen into disuse
nowadays even though the debate regarding the disaffection of the
citizens towards the Community institutional system is still open. A
number of experts have in fact proposed to shift the attention on more
up-to-date issues which are more suitable for immediate solutions
with respect to the course of institutional reforms. Philippe C.
Schmitter is one of the authors who have forcibly tried to exorcise the
problem of democratic deficit which constantly hovers over the
integration process. The following is an excerpt from a speech given
by Schmitter at a round table discussion held by the American
Political Science Association (August 2003) regarding the democratic
9
Ricevi informazioni sui nostri servizi, sulle offerte e non perdere news e consigli su università e lavoro.