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EU decision-making and lobbying: a critical analysis of alternative regulatory frameworks

The focus is on the formal aspects and on the rules regarding the concept of interest representation and lobbying activity at the supranational level, in the EU. With this work I want to give a comprehensive picture of "the state of the art" in the lobbying regulation policy, a topic which has been discussed a lot in recent times but to which a clear definitive answer to the debate has not been given. In the first coceptual part I'll go through a detailed and exahustive description of the environmental background where lobbying activities take place, with a clear outlook on the institutional framework of the EU and an analysis of the new current methods of lobbying within this context.

Mostra/Nascondi contenuto.
5 1. Lobbying in Brussels. 1.1. Definitions and structures. No doubt: The European union of the 2000s has very little in common with the EEC initiated by the treaty of Rome in 1957, and the same is true for lobbying. If we took a quick glance over the last 50 years we realize that lobbying structures and techniques have always been in perpetual motion, as well as political and economic framework of the Community. If we then focus more on the modern days, we understand that it‟s the enlargement, beyond all reasons, that requires radical modifications of the “modes of influence”. With all its expansions: 6, 9, 12, 15, 25, 27, …, the European Union has overstretched and lost its coherence; the logical consequence is that the previous ideal lobbying vehicle – that is to say the classical European association with its seat in Brussels and its 27 national member- associations – becomes all of a sudden obsolete. If a meeting of the 27 Heads of State and governments fails to come to an agreement, why should European association score better? “Victims” of the dilution caused by the enlargement are, not surprisingly, the great majority of those European associations, which now produce vague consensus built upon the lowest common denominator. Credibility – sine qua non condition for influence – no longer exists. With paralysis on the one hand, new political conditions on the other, the solution is clear: in the new contests of influence, the future belongs to transversal lobbying – that is to say the ability to build relationships between the upper and the lower levels, from the producer to the consumer. Progressively, sectoral lobbying will disappear in favour of a type of lobbying organised around a chain of values; and, more importantly, leaving behind its usual stance of opposition, the lobbyist becomes a partner. Thus we witness the flowering of a number of strategic alliances, which can take different forms: ξ Platforms of firms constituted around a common project to remedy the inertia of their respective European association ξ Transversal alliances going from the producers to the consumers that can come up with “ready-made” consensus to propose to the Commission Figure 1.1. The old framework of lobbying system.

Laurea liv.I

Facoltà: Economia

Autore: Andrea Fioravanti Contatta »

Composta da 42 pagine.

 

Questa tesi ha raggiunto 217 click dal 26/02/2010.

 

Consultata integralmente una volta.

Disponibile in PDF, la consultazione è esclusivamente in formato digitale.