Review to Elinor Ostrom's Book ''Governing the Commons''

Since Hardin (1968) "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) was published on the eminent Science magazine: from this day on, the contemporary discussion about the argument reached levels of cross-curricular analysis never touched before.
Hardin's strong word "Tragedy", meant that every available optimal choice would not be affordable in economic terms.
In this article, Hardin started with the description of a global phenomenon where the not controlled demographic growth faced the limits imposed by the natural resources, within the limit of the authorities (Common Goods disciplined by the Public international law were not included in his analysis) . This phenomenon also had a reference to the Common Goods, due to the dilemma between the
individual interest (shown by individual consumers) and the collective interest (shown by the public authorities). The solution for this dilemma is usually situated in the recourse to the Public authorities. Talking about the commons, Hardin found tragic anxieties between consumers, due to the possibility that some of them has to the over-exploit and deteriorate the source itself (in some cases, there would even be cases of profligacy): in fact, if the real tragedy is hidden behind the idea that every single Appropriator will take the entire benefits from the common, but
nobody will sustain the costs for enhancements or for reinstatements, because every Appropriator prefers to share only a little part of the cost, while at the same time the rest of the Appropriators cover up the remaining part of the costs (social costs). The final consequence for this prevailing behavior will be the predation of the Common until its complete depletion. Hardin mentioned the example of the Open Pasture where farmers brought their cattle.
In order to maximize their own utility function (in this case, profits), some farmers enlarge by one marginal unit the quantity of the cattle brought to the Open Pasture:

the ensuing marginal reduction of grass would be very modest (the reduction will damage all the farmers in a fractioned part) while the individual benefit would be higher than the individual cost. This attitude, at first, encourages the farmers to bring higher numbers of livestock for their own individual advantage; then, without any kind of shared restrictions or limitations, lead the Open Pasture to its destruction.

Hardin (1968) also commented this mechanism with a phrase: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all".

Hardin's article and study was implemented by Ostrom (1990), with the observation of both national and international regulators, which can create optional problems. Her explanation defined a new way to find a solution to the Tragedy, by not-following the national/international regulators and entrusting, at the same time, local people who can come up with solutions which better fit the
challenge imposed by the Tragedy.

1) The comedy of the commons (or inverse of the commons) represents the opposite result of the tragedy of the commons, because the people which act in this way, instead of acting egoistically for their personal profit, prefer to share their knowledge with the other part of the community. The term was coined by Carol M. Rose (1986).

2) The tragedy of the anti-commons is a neologism invented by Michael Heller (1998). Many theorist considered this tragedy as the mirror-image of the tragedy of the commons, because in the tragedy of the commons, the commons themselves were over-exploited and left to in a depletion status, while in the tragedy of the anti-commons happened the opposite thing. In a system ruled by the private property, it could happen that the good itself could be misused or underused due to different failures, involving collapsed negotiation between right-holders. This happened for a huge number of stores/retailers in the former second world countries. Many people wanted to negotiate with the right-holders of many closed stores, but no one wanted to rent (or sell) the license for their activity or their activity, despite they were not earning money while demand was growing in the first months after the end of Communism.
The tragedy of the commons is the trivial consequence for both the laws of the demand and supply. To avoid the over-exploitation of the resources, all the consumers of commons, could agree to achieve the privatization of the common itself by creating a market. The creation of a market put the resource into a price system, where demand and supply are the regulators of the market and allow all the consumers, to achieve a level of long sustainability, expressed for example, by an high level of prices. Otherwise, the consumers can agree for a regulation to the access at the Commons, by clarifying the roles of each member and the property shares.
Only few communities in history, succeeded to give themselves regulations to fight the tragedy of the commons, while other communities got stacked in the middle of negotiations or worse, failed totally or waited for other solutions coming from an external institutions (from public authorities or private).
Only few communities succeeded in achieving some results. Before mentioning the classic possible solutions to the tragedy of the commons, hierarchy must be explained. Hierarchy was the key constituent for many successes in different ancient communities, often little based. In these communities, where individual properties were limited, the interest of the monarch was the same of the people.
This statement argues that the tragedy of the commons are one of the main negative results produced by the modern era, started with the first industrialization. The concept of tragedy of the commons was also used by other studious of other disciplines, but it was not such effective for the regulations of commons like: atmosphere, oceans, climate due to the lack of intervention of both possible private owners or public authorities. The international law, the regulator of these commons, does not have and did not have in the past, the necessary "weapons" to fight these problems, but the situation is slowly changing. Unfortunately, international law still remains just a governance mechanism, due to issues in reaching international cooperation, political problems and amount of costs, considered too much high to reach an international agreement.